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On Systemically Important Financial Institutions and
Progressive Systemic Mitigation
James B. Thomson*
ABSTRACT
One of the most important issues in the regulatory reform debate is
the systematic importance of certain financial institutions. This Ar-
ticle proposes a framework for identifying and supervising such in-
stitutions. The framework is designed to remove the advantages
they derive from becoming systemically important and to give them
more time-consistent incentives. It defines the "four C's" of sys-
temic importance (contagion, concentration, correlation, and condi-
tions) as criteria for classifying firms as systemically important that
goes beyond binary classification based on size alone (the classic
doctrine of too-big-to-fail). This Article also discusses the concept
of progressive systemic mitigation.
I. SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
PROGRESSIVE SYSTEMIC MITIGATION
Central banks increasingly define financial stability as a key mis-
sion, second only to monetary policy. Achieving financial stability in-
volves promoting time-consistent incentives for financial firms and
other market participants. Getting the incentives right requires super-
visors to deal with systemic risk and, in particular, systemically impor-
tant financial institutions. Establishing a financial stability supervisor
alone will not achieve stability; it is also crucial to deal proactively
with systemically important financial institutions. To do so, it is neces-
sary to have a workable definition of "systemically important."
On one level, the definition is fairly simple. A firm is considered
systemically important if its failure would have economically signifi-
cant spillover effects, which could destabilize the financial system and
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serve Bank of Cleveland. The views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, or their respective staffs. The author thanks the regulatory reform workgroup at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (Jean Burson, Emre Ergungor, Mark Greenlee, Joe
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have a negative impact on the real economy. This definition is unsat-
isfactory because it provides little guidance in practice. What is
needed is a workable definition of "systemically important." How-
ever, because a variety of factors could make a firm systemically im-
portant, a one-size-fits-all definition is not very useful.
What can be gained from putting parameters around the term? De-
lineating the factors that might make a financial institution systemi-
cally important is the first step towards managing the risk arising from
it. Understanding why a firm might be systemically important is nec-
essary to establish measures that reduce the number of systematically
important firms and develop procedures for resolving the insolvency
of such firms at the lowest total cost (including the long-run cost) to
the economy. This, of course, involves careful consideration of the
types of resolution authority needed, the funding source for operating
any such authority, and the related infrastructure. While a credible
resolution process should involve addressing contingency plans as part
of the supervisory regime, the discussion of the type and form of reso-
lution authority is left to a companion article.
This Article aims to establish a set of criteria for designating finan-
cial firms as systemically important. First, the sources of systemic risk
are identified through the consideration of how a financial institution
becomes systemically important. Regarding systemic importance as a
continuum rather than a binary distinction, this Article then investi-
gates the usefulness of establishing categories of systemic importance
and the trade-off between a manageable definition and the number of
categories used to classify financial institutions. Next, this Article dis-
cusses the establishment of a list of systemically important financial
institutions, weighs the merits of making such a list public, and offers
criteria for categorizing institutions. This Article then concludes with
policy recommendations.
II. DEFINING SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The purpose of creating a practical definition of systemic impor-
tance is to enable supervisors to discipline systemically important fi-
nancial institutions. Understanding the nature and causes of systemic
importance is the foundation for creating regulations, supervisory pol-
icies, and infrastructure that will rein in the associated systemic risk.
In some cases, doing so sufficiently mitigates an institution's potential
systemic impact so that it would no longer be considered systemically
important. Because any two firms could be deemed systemically im-
portant for unrelated reasons, a one-size-fits-all designation such as
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"too-big-to-fail" is inadequate.' Consequently, the approach taken
here proposes a means of classifying systemically important financial
institutions ("SIFIs").
A. Size
Size alone is not an adequate criterion for classifying institutions as
systemically important. While a size threshold is the simplest way to
categorize SIFIs-whether it be asset-based, activity-based, or both-
it is potentially the most flawed method for doing so. Ideally, a size-
based classification should account for not just the level of activity,
but also for the nature of the financial institution's activities. For in-
stance, a bank with five-percent of assets nationwide that holds a port-
folio largely consisting of government and agency securities is likely to
have less serious systemic implications than a comparable bank with a
portfolio of commercial and industrial loans. After all, absent embez-
zlement and fraud, the bank holding mostly low-risk, marketable se-
curities will be less likely to fail, and will cause less serious
consequences if it does fail, than the bank holding more opaque, risk-
ier commercial and industrial loans. Further, off-balance-sheet activi-
ties might also need to be accounted for. Credit substitutes, such as
letters of credit and lines of credit, are rightfully included in financial
firms' credit-intermediation activities. Moreover, it is important to
define SIFIs in a way that minimizes unintended consequences, such
as reducing market discipline on firms added to the SIFI list.
Although the size threshold could certainly be set low enough to
capture most of the firms that are systemically important for other
reasons, the majority would not be systemically important. Including
these firms would put too heavy a burden on them. One objective of
defining systemically important institutions is to allow differential reg-
ulatory taxes, or user fees, across types. Efficiency and equity con-
cerns therefore require more flexible definitions. The definitions
presented are based on four factors other than size, which, individu-
ally or collectively, can make a financial institution systemically im-
portant. These are the "four C's" of systemic importance: contagion,
correlation, concentration, and conditions (context).
As a starting point for a size-based definition, a conglomerate finan-
cial firm would be considered systemically important if it accounts for
at least ten-percent of the activities or assets of a principal financial
1. The first incarnation of the SIFI philosophy of "too-big-to-fail" dates back to the FDIC
bailout of the Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company of Chicago in 1984. See generally
IRVINE H. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT: AN INSIDER'S AccouNr OF BANK FAILURES AND RESCUES (Ba-
sic Books 1986) (discussing the failure and rescue of Continental Illinois).
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sector or financial market, or five-percent of the total financial mar-
ket's activities or assets.2 Using current financial-sector designations
as a guide, a SIFI would satisfy any of the following criteria.3
* The consolidated entity holds ten-percent or more of nationwide
banking assets, or has five-percent of nationwide banking assets
and fifteen-percent or more of loans.
* After converting off-balance-sheet activities into balance-sheet
equivalents, the consolidated entity holds ten-percent or more of
nationwide banking assets. Off-balance-sheet items would in-
clude, for instance, items from schedule RC-L from the FFIEC
Reports of Condition and Income and HC-L from the Federal
Reserve Y9 reports4; structured investment vehicles and other
loan special purpose entities used to remove assets from the
firm's balance sheet for regulatory capital purposes; and assets
sold or securitized.5
* The consolidated entity accounts for ten-percent of the total num-
ber or total value of life insurance products (whole and universal
life policies and annuities) nationwide.
* The consolidated entity accounts for fifteen-percent of the total
number or total value of all insurance products (whole and uni-
versal life policies, property and casualty policies, annuities, etc.)
nationwide.
* A non-bank financial institution other than a traditional insur-
ance company (one that underwrites and prices its products using
actuarially sound principles) such as an investment bank might be
considered systemically important if:
o its total asset holdings would rank it as one of the 10 largest
banks in the country;
o its total assets would rank it in the top 20 largest banks and its
adjusted total assets (accounting for off-balance sheet activi-
ties) would rank it in the top 10 largest banks; or
o it accounted for more than twenty-percent of securities under-
written (averaged over the previous five years).
2. These standards could be established on a book or fair-market basis. Ideally, SIFI thresh-
olds would be determined using fair-value accounting as far as possible.
3. These are examples of possible thresholds; however, any proposed system of thresholds
must be vetted and, if possible, established (and periodically updated) on the basis of empirical
studies.
4. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Schedule RC-L, Off-Balance Sheet Items, availa-
ble at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/call/crinst/398rc-l.pdf.
5. It might be prudent to apply the adjusted-asset test only to financial institutions that hold
more than five-percent of U.S. banking assets.
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B. Contagion
The two classic cases of contagion as a source of systemic impor-
tance are failures of Herstatt Bank in 1974 and Continental Illinois in
1984.6 Although Herstatt was a relatively small institution, its closing
had the potential to disrupt the international payments system and
imposed nontrivial losses on its counterparts. As discussed by Todd
and Thomson, the stated rationale for the FDIC bailout of all Conti-
nental Illinois's creditors was the threat that losses would be transmit-
ted to some 2,300 community banks that had correspondent-banking
relationships with Continental.7 Most recently, the justification for
the Federal Reserve of New York's assisted acquisition of Bear
Stearns by JPMorgan Chase appears to have been concerns about
contagion.8 In this case, the source of contagion was the potential for
loss transmission through the credit-default-swaps market. In princi-
ple, the ability to put parameters around contagion as source of sys-
temic importance should enable effective treatments to mitigate
contagion.
A financial institution would be considered systemically important
if its failure could result in:
* substantial capital impairment of institutions accounting for a
combined thirty-percent of the assets of the financial system;
* the locking up or material impairment of essential payments sys-
tems (domestic or international); or
* the collapse or freezing up of one or more important financial
markets.
A substantial impairment of a payments system or market would be
one that is large or long enough to affect real economic activity.9
C. Correlation
Correlation as a source of systemic importance is also known as the
"too-many-to-fail" problem.' 0 Penati and Protopapadakis show how
correlated risk exposure contributed to the overexposure of large U.S.
6. Walker F. Todd & James B. Thomson, An Insider's View of the Political Economy of the
Too Big to Let Fail Doctrine (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 9017, 1990).
7. Id. at 18-19.
8. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report, Feb. 24, 2009,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mpr-20090225_appendixa.htm.
9. It is important that studies be performed in order to define the parameters of a material or
substantial disruption of the payments system carefully.
10. See generally Janet Mitchell, Strategic Creditor Passivity, Regulation, and Bank Bailouts
(CEPR discussion paper no. 1780, 1988) (discussing the "too-many-to-fail" problem)
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banks to borrowers in developing countries."1 There are two impor-
tant aspects of correlation risk. First, the institutions have the incen-
tive to take on risks that are highly correlated with other institutions
because policymakers are less likely to close an institution if many
other institutions would become decapitalized at the same time. This
is consistent with the casual observation of herding behavior in the
financial system which, in the most recent episode, took the form of
financial institutions overexposing themselves to subprime mortgages,
mortgage-backed securities, and related mortgage-derivative securi-
ties. Second, the potential exists for largely uncorrelated risk expo-
sures to become highly correlated in periods of financial stress.
Andrew Lo designated this phenomenon as "phase-locking behav-
ior."1 2 This means that a group of institutions that would not typically
pose a systemic threat might, in certain economic or financial-market
conditions, become systemically important. The 1980s savings and
loan debacle in the United States is an example of this.13 As most of
the savings and loan industry was exposed to interest-rate risk, the
interest-rate shocks of the late 1970s and early 1980s decapitalized the
majority of institutions. 14 This second form of correlation-driven sys-
temic importance is actually an example of condition- or context-
driven systemic importance.
The "too-many-to-fail" problem is a bit more difficult because it
requires that a group or subset of institutions be classified as jointly
systemic. As in the case of contagion, putting parameters around cor-
related risk exposure, including determining what level of correlation
across portfolios and volatility of exposure poses a systemic threat, is
the first step towards developing and implementing regulatory treat-
ments. Classifying institutions as systemically important because of
correlated risks would result in developing and estimating risk models,
using stress testing and scenario analysis, and establishing a set of fun-
damental risk exposures that financial institutions' portfolios could be
mapped into. Fortunately, some large financial institutions are doing
this type of risk modeling and scenario analysis for looking at their
own risk profile. This analysis provides a good foundation for others
to work from. Moreover, academic economists have begun to think
11. See generally Alessandro Penati and Aris Protopapadakis, The Effect of Implicit Deposit
Insurance on Banks' Portfolio Choices with an Application to International Overexposure, 21 J.
OF MONETARY ECON. 107 (1988); see generally Janet Mitchell, supra note 9.
12. See ANDREW W. Lo, HEDGE FUNDS: AN ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 18-22 (Princeton Univ.
Press. 2008).
13. Id. at 18.
14. See EDWARD J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID rr HAPPEN? 63-92 (The
Urban Institute 1989).
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about modeling macro-financial risks in the economy, a step towards
modeling and quantifying correlated-risk exposure.' 5
What levels of correlated risks would give rise to systemic concerns?
The following thresholds would make groups of institutions systemi-
cally important.
* The probability that an economic or financial shock would de-
capitalize institutions accounting, in aggregate, for thirty-five per-
cent of financial system assets or twenty-percent of banking
assets.
* Potential for economic/financial shock to decapitalize institutions
accounting, in aggregate, for fifteen-percent of financial system
assets or ten-percent of banking assets, and for nationwide shares
amounting to:
o fifteen-percent of wholesale or retail payments;
o thirty-five percent of a major credit activity; 16
o fifty-percent of securities processing or thirty-percent of securi-
ties underwriting (five-year average);
o twenty-percent of the total number or total value of life insur-
ance products (universal and whole life policies and annuities);
or
o thirty-percent of the total number or total value of insurance
products (whole and universal life policies, property and casu-
alty policies, annuities, etc.).
D. Concentration
Presence by dominant firms in key financial markets or activities
can give rise to systemic importance if the failure of one of these firms
could materially disrupt or lock up the market. Concentration has
two important aspects: the size of the firm's activities relative to the
market and the contestability of the market. That is, concentration is
less likely to make a financial institution systemically important if,
other things being equal, the activities of a distressed institution can
easily be assumed by a new entrant into the market or by the expan-
sion of an incumbent firm's activities. Hence, it is logical to adjust
concentration thresholds to account for contestability.
15. See, e.g., Dale F. Gray et al., A New Framework for Analyzing and Managing
Macrofinancial Risks of an Economy (NBER, Working Paper No. 12637, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2637.
16. Fairly broad definitions of credit activities should be used. For example, the categories
might include commercial credit, housing finance, small-business credit, agricultural credit, and
consumer credit. Moreover, it is necessary to establish a threshold for categorizing a credit activ-
ity as major.
141
142 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL
A financial institution is systemically important if its failure could
materially disrupt a financial market or payments system. This causes
economically significant spillover effects that impede the functioning
of broader financial markets and/or the real economy. Thresholds for
concentration that would render a financial institution systemically
important include any firm (on a consolidated basis) that:
* clears and settles more than twenty-five percent of trades in a key
financial market;
* processes more than twenty-five percent of the daily volume of
an essential payments system; or
* is responsible for more than thirty-percent of an important credit
activity.
E. Conditions/Context
In certain states of nature or some macro-financial conditions, clo-
sure policy may not be independent of these conditions. In other
words, regulators are reluctant to allow the official failure (closure) of
a distressed financial institution under particular economic or finan-
cial market conditions if its solvency could have been resolved under
more normal conditions. Hence, conditions/context are sources of sys-
temic importance. For instance, Haubrich notes that the New York
Federal Reserve's reluctance to allow the failure of Long-Term Capi-
tal Management ("LTCM") resulted largely from the fragility of fi-
nancial markets at that time-due to the Southeast Asian currency
crises and the Russian default.17 This might explain, in part, why
LTCM was treated as systemically important and Amaranth (which
was more than twice as big) was not. Another example would be the
intervention by the government to prevent the bankruptcy of Bear
Stearns by merging it (with assistance) into JPMorgan Chase in early
2008, whereas Drexel Burnham Lambert was allowed to enter bank-
ruptcy in early 1990.18
Firms that might be made systemically important by conditions/con-
text are probably the most difficult to identify in advance. Certainly,
stress testing and scenario analysis will be needed to identify them.
As discussed above, during periods of financial market distress, phase-
locking behavior can cause what would otherwise be slightly corre-
17. It is worth noting that the LTCM rescue was a temporary measure designed to wind down
the affairs of LTCM in an orderly fashion, a kind of prepackage bankruptcy. See generally Jo-
seph G. Haubrich, Some Lessons on the Rescue of Long-Term Capital Management 3 (Fed. Res.
Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper No. 19, 2007) (discussing the rescue of LTCM).
18. Stephen Labathon, The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert; The Firm Is Not Expected
to Survive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1990.
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lated risk exposures to become highly correlated. 19 As a result, a
group of institutions that would not pose a systemic threat under nor-
mal economic or financial-market conditions become systemically
important.
Two sets of criteria must be established to classify firms that are
systemically important because of context. First, the probability that
economic or financial conditions will materialize can produce the state
of nature where a firm or group of firms becomes systemically impor-
tant. Second, the thresholds for systemic importance, which presuma-
bly would be based on those used to classify SIFIs according to
contagion, concentration, and correlation during normal market con-
ditions. Which thresholds are applied would depend on which type of
systemic importance the conditions produce.
III. ESTABLISHING SIFI CATEGORIES
One method to classify systemically important financial institutions
was suggested in the Geneva report.20 Institutions may be systemic on
their own, as part of group, or in a particular context (or state of the
economy). 21 Under this classification scheme, there would likely be
four or five categories of institutions. Category four would consist of
large, but not overly complex, regional financial institutions. Cate-
gory five would consist of community financial institutions. Institu-
tions could migrate between categories as their activities and risks
evolve.
Constructing categories permits application of the modern tax prin-
ciples of horizontal and vertical equity in regulating FISIs. Within
each category, every financial institution would be subject to
equivalent regulatory treatment and intensity of supervision. Of
course, because two institutions could fall under the same category for
different reasons, the exact forms of their regulatory taxes would logi-
cally differ. In this case, equitable treatment consists of the same de-
gree of regulatory interference (level of regulatory taxes), although
the forms of regulation may not be exactly the same. As firms move
up the categories, firms would be subject to increased levels of regula-
tory interference and supervisory attention-that is, progressive sys-
temic mitigation-analogous to the prompt corrective action
19. Lo, supra note 11.
20. Markus Brunnermeier et al., The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, 2009
Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11 (January 6, 2009) (unpublished position paper),
available at http://www.princeton.edu/-markus/research/papers/Genevall.pdf.
21. Id.
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provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act of 1991.22
Increased regulatory taxes and supervisory scrutiny for higher cate-
gories can be justified in terms of economic efficiency and equity. For
instance, economic efficiency dictates that regulatory taxes increase to
the point where the cost of the last increment of these taxes equals the
benefit of imposing them. It is likely that the cost of complying with
additional regulations is inversely related an institution's size and
complexity, while the benefits from additional regulation are directly
related. Hence, as institutions become larger and more complex, in-
creased regulation and more intensive supervision may be consistent
with economic efficiency. Furthermore, to the extent that the wedge
between the private and social costs of failure is related to an institu-
tion's size and complexity, economic efficiency demands graduated
sets of regulatory taxes, which are designed to internalize the
externalities.
There are equally compelling arguments for progressively intensive
or intrusive regulatory treatments on the grounds of equity as firms
move up the systemic category ladder. One such is the "level playing
field" argument: to the extent that systemic importance confers com-
petitive advantages on an institution, equity concerns would dictate a
system of graduated regulatory taxes to remove (or at least minimize)
the advantages of being (or becoming) systemically important.
Of the five categories, only three would contain financial institu-
tions that are considered systemically important. The rationale for a
five-category system is that it allows for more consistent application of
regulatory taxes and supervisory oversight across categories, following
the notion that differential supervision and regulation can level the
playing field by mitigating the advantages financial institutions derive
from systemic importance. 23 The categories would likely be defined
as follows:
Category 1
Financial institutions that would be considered SIFIs on the basis of
size alone (the classic "too-big-to-fail" category) or due to concentra-
22. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 12 U.S.C. § 1811
(1991).
23. Another rationale for systemic categories is the degree to which markets can, or would be,
allowed to discipline systemic institutions can differ across categories, with higher categories
containing financial institutions where market discipline is less likely to be effective (or those
that are allowed to operate unfettered).
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tion (the firm is a dominant player in an economically significant fi-
nancial market or activity).
Category 2
Financial institutions that are systemically important because of inter-
connectedness (interbank or inter-firm exposure, also known as
contagion).
Category 3
Financial institutions that are systemically important as a group be-
cause of correlated risk exposures (the "too-many-to-fail" problem).
Also included in this category would be financial institutions that are
systemically important because of conditions or context.
Category 4
Large financial institutions that are not systemically important but
whose failure could have economically significant implications for re-
gional economies. This category would include large regional banking
companies and large insurance companies.
Category 5
Financial institutions not included in the other categories, consisting
primarily of community financial institutions.
Under the philosophy of progressive systemic mitigation, institu-
tions in category five would be subject to a basic level of safety-and-
soundness regulation and supervisory oversight. No special reporting
requirements, targeted risk exams, or other treatments would be nec-
essary.24 Category four institutions would not face any special capital
surcharges or activity restrictions that might apply in categories one
through three, but they would be subject to additional reporting re-
quirements and expected to implement risk management systems and
more sophisticated risk controls than category five institutions. More-
over, category four institutions would be subject to more vigorous su-
pervision than those in category five. 2 5
24. These institutions would remain subject to consumer regulation.
25. Recently, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Sandra Pianalto outlined a
new regulatory scheme called "tiered parity." In this scheme, financial firms would be separated
into three classes or tiers based upon their complexity. As in the present proposal, regulatory
treatment of a firm would be determined by which tier it is assigned to (with equal regulatory
treatment of firms within a tier). To go from the five-category progressive systemic mitigation
scheme to the three tiers of the tiered parity scheme, you simply combine categories 4 and 5 in
tier 3 and categories 2 and 3 in tier 2. Category 1 of progressive systemic mitigation is essentially
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At a minimum, category three institutions should be subject to rou-
tine stress tests and be required to have contingency plans in place.
Regulatory agencies need to conduct routine scenario analysis and
simulations to ascertain the financial system's vulnerability to a corre-
lated-risk event and establish the appropriate regulatory treatment.
Such treatment might include actions like portfolio limits, add-on cap-
ital requirements, and loss reserves tied to the activities driving the
correlated risks. Scenario analysis and risk simulations would be used
as part of contingency plans for handling correlated risk events. Stress
tests, scenario analysis, risk simulations, and contingency plans would
also be part of the operational regulatory system for dealing with insti-
tutions that are rendered systemically important by conditions or
context.
Progressive systemic mitigation implies that the treatments adopted
for category three institutions should also be applied to those in cate-
gories one and two. For category two institutions, it is necessary to
establish regulatory reporting requirements that allow for inter-bank/
inter-firm exposures, both direct and indirect, to be tracked and mea-
sured. In addition, limits on direct and indirect exposure to
counterparties should be instituted, along with specific reserves and
add-on capital charges designed to limit contagion across firms. For
category one institutions, two more types of regulatory treatment
need to be added to those faced by category two institutions. First,
market discipline should be enhanced through mandatory debt-struc-
ture requirements, which could include a mandatory subordinated
debt requirement and/or reverse convertible debentures. 26 Moreover,
a system of double indemnity for shareholders in category one institu-
tions could be an effective device for providing socially compatible
incentives for those institutions.27
However, this is only a partial set of remedies that might be applied
progressively to financial institutions in each category. Naturally, the
exact regulatory treatments and the nature of the increased supervi-
sory attention call for additional study. As a system of regulatory
the same as tier 1 of the Cleveland Federal Reserve's tiered-parity proposal. See Sandra Pi-
analto, Ohio Banker's Day Address: Steps Toward a New Financial Regulatory Architecture 3-4
(Apr. 1, 2009) (explaining the "tiered parity" scheme), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/
ForthePublic/News-andMedia/Speeches/2009/Pianalto_20090401.cfm.
26. See generally Rong Fan et al., Getting the Most Out of a Mandatory Subordinated Debt
Requirement, 24 J. OF FiN. SERVs. RES. 149 (2003) (discussing mandatory subordinated debt
requirements); see also generally Mark J. Flannery, Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with
Contingent Capital Certificates (October 6, 2009) (unpublished article, University of Florida)
(discussing reverse convertible debentures), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1285689.
27. See Edward J. Kane, No Room for Weak Links in the Chain of Deposit Insurance Reform,
1 J. OF FIN. SERVS. REs. 77, 89 (1987).
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taxes progressive systemic mitigation is subject to the regulatory dia-
lectic . Consequently, it is important to understand the unintended
consequences of whatever treatments are adopted. 28 Such an under-
standing will help reduce the deadweight losses of the regulatory re-
gime and increase regulators' ability to respond dynamically to an
evolving financial system.
IV. TRANSPARENCY VERSUS CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY:
SHOULD THE LIST OF SIFIs BE PUBLIC?
How much information is made public (details about SIFIs, criteria
for inclusion in the categories, and the associated regulatory treat-
ment) depends on several factors: the extent to which the supervisory
regime utilizes market discipline; whether inclusion on the list has un-
intended certification effects (or, alternatively, whether ambiguity
reduces the credibility of implicit government guarantees); and the de-
gree to which markets can reliably identify the financial institutions
that populate the categories. 29 The more information is released-
that is, the closer the regime is to full disclosure-the more side issues
must be addressed. For instance, how will an institution's inclusion
in-or removal from-the list of SIFIs or the promotion (demotion)
to a higher (lower) category be communicated? Will there be watch
lists of SIFIs that are under consideration for change in status? Would
the names of firms that are systemically important because of context/
conditions be made public? If made public, what additional informa-
tion (such as risk models, scenario analysis, and simulations) should
be provided?
The choice of disclosure regime would seem to be between trans-
parency (publication of the list of firms in each category) and some
version of constructive ambiguity, where selected information is re-
leased. The term "constructive ambiguity" has been attributed to for-
mer Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.30 In a diplomatic context, it
refers to the use of ambiguous statements as part of a negotiating
strategy; however, in the context of central banking and financial mar-
kets, the term refers to a policy of using ambiguous statements to sig-
28. See Edward J. Kane, Good Intentions and Unintended Evil: The Case against Selective
Credit Allocation, 9 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 55, 57 (1977) (discussing the regulatory
dialectic).
29. See generally Allen Berger et al., Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank
Performance: Who Knows What When?, 32 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 641 (2000) (ana-
lyzing how markets discover regulatory information).
30. John Linarelli, China and the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement, 8 J. CHI-
NESE L. 185, 224 (1994) (citing Peter G. Peterson, Address at the China Business and Financial
Symposium sponsored by China Daily (May 4, 1994)).
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nal intent while retaining policy flexibility. In the context of the
federal financial safety net, many have argued for a policy of construc-
tive ambiguity to limit expansion of the federal financial safety net.3 1
The notion here is that if market participants are uncertain whether
their claim on a financial institution will be guaranteed, they will exert
more risk discipline on the firm. In this context, constructive ambigu-
ity is a regulatory tactic for limiting the extent to which de facto gov-
ernment guarantees are extended to the liabilities of the firms that
regulators consider systemically important. Uncertainty about
whether a firm is considered systemically important and which cate-
gory it belongs to in the progressive systemic mitigation regime may,
at the margin, exert stronger market discipline on institutions than if
the list of SIFIs were made public.
A policy of supervisory transparency is superior to constructive am-
biguity for our purposes for a number of reasons. First, when broadly
viewed, constructive ambiguity is a competitor of the progressive sys-
temic mitigation regime proposed in this paper. Constructive ambigu-
ity is a supervisory policy aimed at reducing the agency problems
associated with firms' systemic importance by creating uncertainty
about which firms and creditors might be rescued if a firm fails. Pro-
gressive systemic mitigation is an explicit set of regulations and super-
visory policies designed to reduce (if not eliminate) the advantages of
being systemically important. Under its rules, the institution and its
stakeholders would internalize the social costs of systemic importance.
Second, to the extent that SIFIs would be subject to specific sets of
regulatory treatments, it is unlikely that there would be much value in
continuing the policy of constructive ambiguity in the proposed pro-
gressive systemic mitigation system. After all, markets will probably
be able to surmise which firms are on the SIFI list by observing differ-
ences in capital structure, balance sheet entries (including footnotes),
and intensity of regulatory scrutiny. Third, increased transparency
would improve supervisory accountability, better aligning supervisory
incentives with the interests of taxpayers. Finally, the benefit of con-
structive ambiguity in avoiding a SIFI certification, resulting from
publishing a list of SIFI firms, would only affect a small number of
firms at the margin. The efficiency gains of avoiding the certification
31. See generally Frederic S. Mishkin, Financial Consolidation: Dangers and Opportunities, 23
J. OF BANKING & FIN. 675 (1999) (discussing constructive ambiguity as a tool for limiting conjec-
tural government guarantees of bank creditors); see generally Marvin Goodfriend & Jeffrey M.
Lacker, Limited Commitment and Central Bank Lending, 85 FED. REs. BANK OF RICHMOND
ECON. Q. 1 (1999) (discussing constructive ambiguity in the context of lender-of-last-resort
policies).
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effect on these marginally systemic firms is likely to be overcome by
efficiency losses associated with withholding information from the
market. Hence, the list of SIFIs, including categories and criteria for
inclusion, should be made public, along with a watch list of financial
institutions whose SIFI status might change.
An effective system of supervisory transparency entails more than
simply disclosing information; it must also include producing informa-
tion and disseminating it in a useful form.32 A case on point is the
argument for requiring credit rating organizations to disclose informa-
tion, such as probabilities of default and loss given default, upon
which a rating is based.33 In the supervisory transparency regime, this
means that all information used to assign institutions to an SIFI cate-
gory-including supervisory risk models and their results-should be
disclosed. 34 Furthermore, stress tests of SIFIs, along with contingency
plans for handling the financial distress of one or more large financial
institutions, should be implemented and disclosed.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The legacy of economic and financial crises is a post-crisis regime
characterized by increased government interference in markets. How-
ever, simply increasing the amount of formal regulation and the de-
gree of supervisory oversight and interference is not necessarily the
best path forward. Financial market reforms must deal in the most
cost effective way with the fundamental issues that contributed to the
current crisis. One of the most important issues that regulators, legis-
lators, and other policymakers must face is that of systemically impor-
tant financial institutions.
This Article proposes the study and subsequent adoption of a finan-
cial market supervisory infrastructure in which SIFIs are identified
and categorized according to the nature or source of their systemic
importance, and subjected to specific regulatory treatments that ad-
32. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2001, SR 01-6: Enhancement to
Public Disclosure, Division of Banking Supervision, April (proffering the recommendations of
the 2001 Working Group on Public Disclosure, which suggests that supervisors release informa-
tion, such as data about risk exposure, that provides a consistent view of a bank's risk manage-
ment approach), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2001/sr0106.htm.
33. See Charles W. Calomiris, "The Subprime Turmoil: What's Old, What's New, and What's
Next" Presentation at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Symposium: Maintaining Sta-
bility in a Changing Financial System 20 (Aug. 21-22, 2008), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/
publicat/sympos/2008/Calomiris.10.02.08.pdf.
34. In cases where releasing a piece of information could result in the disclosure of confiden-
tial business information, suppression of the information should be predicated on a careful cost-
benefit analysis, which weighs the financial institution's private interests against the benefits to
society.
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dress the risk these firms impose. The ultimate objective of progres-
sive systemic mitigation is to improve economic efficiency by
promoting socially compatible risk incentives for SIFIs and increase
fairness in the financial system by leveling the playing field. The
means to achieve this is to reduce or remove, through regulatory
taxes, the advantages of being systemically important.
Specific regulatory treatments to deal with the "four C's" of sys-
temic importance (contagion, correlation, concentration, and context/
conditions) must be carefully studied before they are adopted. These
regulatory treatments might include, but are not limited to the follow-
ing: capital surcharges, special reserves, mandatory subordinated debt
and/or reverse capital debentures, inter-firm exposure limits, and in-
creased regulatory reporting requirements. Moreover, banking super-
visors should be required to conduct periodic systemic risk analyses,
stress tests, and other simulations as part of a contingency planning
process. This would improve regulators' ability to deal in the most
cost effective manner (combined short- and long-term costs) with the
failure of one or more SIFIs. Finally, the information disclosure re-
gime must be addressed when implementing the new supervisory ar-
chitecture. This article argues for full transparency, which includes
publishing the list of SIFIs, presumably on a quarterly basis. The cri-
teria for inclusion in an SIFI category should be disclosed as well as
the specific regulatory treatments. In addition, financial institutions
whose systemic status may be upgraded or downgraded should be in-
cluded on a published watch list.
In conclusion, this scheme envisions a financial market supervisory
infrastructure where systemically important financial institutions are
identified, separated into categories based on nature of their systemic
importance, and subjected to specific regulatory treatments designed
to address the systemic risk these firms impose. The ultimate objec-
tive is to promote socially compatible risk incentives for systemically
important financial institutions and fairness in the financial system by
leveling the playing field - by reducing or removing, through regula-
tory taxes, the advantages associated with being systemically impor-
tant. Transparency is an important part of any supervisory system
because it allows for more effective market discipline and increased
supervisory accountability.
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